This study assesses the comparative economics of governance in fighting terrorism in 53
Introduction
The motivation for this inquiry is fourfold: (i) increasing challenges of terrorism to Africa's development; (ii) ongoing debates surrounding the role of governance in mitigating terrorism; (iii) paradigm shifts in the conception and definition of governance and (iv) shortcomings in the literature. The four highlighted points are engaged chronologically.
According to Alfa-Wali et al. (2015) , trauma from terrorism is increasingly a policy challenge in Africa. According to the authors, while terrorism is not an entirely new phenomenon in Africa, the scale and magnitude with which it has increased over the past years is substantial. The authors are consistent with the position that several factors contribute toward providing an enabling environment for the growth of terrorism on the continent, notably: religious fundamentalism; tribal and ethnic tensions and increasing political instability at regional levels (Fazel, 2013) . Clavarino (2014) concurs with this narrative in the perspective that compared to other regions of the world, in spite of Africa currently experiencing surges in waves of radicalisation from Islamic extremism; the continent is not being given the policy attention it deserves because most of the focus has been on the Middle East. Some notable terrorist organisations that are burgeoning across the continent include: alShabab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
The literature on the terrorism-governance nexus is clouded with a lot of controversy (Lee, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) . The first strand contends that good institutions 2 are not useful in reducing terrorism because the interests of terrorists' organizations may not be represented by democratic government institutions (Gause, 2005) . According to the strand, terrorism can be entertained in societies characterized with comparatively good governance standards because of a number of factors that are directly or indirectly linked to grievances and enabling conditions for terrorism activities, namely: civil liberties, freedom and access to media and freedom of speech with which dissatisfaction and disagreement can be expressed (Ross, 1993) . The strand of the literature concurs with more contemporary narratives sympathetic to the perspective that exclusive socio-economic development in advanced democracies with good governance motivates terrorism activities (Bass, 2014) . A case in point according to Foster (2014) is second-generation Western-educated youths from Europe joining the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) because they feel treated like foreigners in their countries. However, a second strand argues that fundamental characteristics 2 Throughout the study, this term 'governance' is used interchangeably with 'institutions'. It should be noted that the former concept is distinct from 'institutional governance' which is denoted by the rule of law and corruptioncontrol (see Asongu, 2016a) . of good institutions can mitigate negative sentiments towards the state and therefore, reduce the likelihood of terrorist entities recruiting Islamic fundamentalists (see Windsor, 2003; Li, 2005) .
Recent literature on the quality of institutions in Africa has witnessed two major improvements in the conception and measurement of governance. On the conception front, the paradigm shift is motivated by the two principal models of development for Africa in the contemporary era, namely: the Beijing model that prioritises economic governance (or economic rights) versus the Washington consensus that places more emphasis on political governance (or political rights) (Asongu, 2016b; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016) . The corresponding literature provides insights into which governance priorities are needed in the short-and longrun to address African development challenges. On the measurement front, it is difficult to measure some of the conceptions of governance underlying the Washington consensus and the Beijing model without an initial bundling of institutions for more representative and/or composite indicators. For example, priorities of the Beijing model and Washington consensus which are respectively economic governance and political governance cannot be measured without bundling some constituent indicators, namely: regulation quality and government effectiveness for economic governance and voice & accountability and political stability for political governance. The above paradigm shifts in the conception and measurement of institutions is motivating a growing stream of literature on the comparative African economics of governance for development outcomes, inter alia: (i) most relevant governance mechanisms in stimulating innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and (ii) negative government signals of the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) .
The literature on relevant instruments by which conflicts could be mitigated and terrorism fought, has proposed a number of interesting channels. On the one hand, more general mechanisms include: press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013) ; military tools (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010) ; understanding of attitudes towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) ; dynamics of transparency (Bell et al., 2014) and education/bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008; Brockhoff et al., 2015) . On the other hand, African-specific studies have been oriented towards exploring and examining: the role of the African Union in the fight against terrorism (Ewi & Aning, 2006) ; the absence of freedoms and presence of poverty (Barros et al., 2008) ; geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012) and how competition by military companies affect the rate at which conflicts are terminated (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, 2013) .
With respect to the role of governance in mitigating terrorism, emphasis has either been skewed towards the influence of democratic institutions (Savun & Phillips, 2009; Lee, are based on a decomposed full sample in order to articulate the fundamental characteristics for comparative purposes. The following broad findings are established. First, good governance is an appealing tool in fighting terrorism. Second, the relevance of the good governance dynamics is as follows in order of increasing relevance: economic governance, institutional governance and political governance. The findings are presented in increasing order of magnitude to emphasise fundamental features in which governance dynamics have the highest effect in mitigating terrorism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical underpinnings are covered in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis, discussion of results and implications are engaged in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with future research directions.
Stylized facts and theoretical underpinnings

Stylized facts
There are a number of interesting stylized facts linking the nexus between the quality institutions and terrorism on the African continent. Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006) . Poor institutions in Africa are substantially contributing to providing a fertile ground for the development of terrorism and extremism on the continent (Clavarino, 2014) . Terrorists' organisations in Africa are growing in scale and scope because of a plethora of inherent weakenesses that Islamic fundamentalists (for the most part) can leverage upon, namely: prosperous drug trade from which profits are reinvested in the financing of terrorism; porous borders and undertrained/underequipped armies and vulnerable/corrupt central governments. Clavarino posits that since the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan regime in 2011, Islamic insurgency and militancy have been on a sharply increasing curve in the Sahel region.
Moreover, the 2013 French-led intervention in the Western African nation of Mali has contributed to scattering Islamic fondamentalists across the continent. In other parts of Africa, the rise of Islamist militancy is traceable to poor governance for the most part. We put this nexus between poor governance and terrorism into more perspective. The Boko Haram is flurishing in North Eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries particularly in areas where government presence is weak. For example according to Asongu and Biekpe (2018) According to Solomon (2017) When the figures are observed from vertical and horizontal perspectives, there are consistent negative nexuses between terrorism and governance. Whereas these figures inform the study on the expected sign of the relationships being investigated, the study cannot rely exclusively on the graphs for two main reasons. On the one hand, it is worthwhile to assess whether the established graphical nexuses withstand empirical validity. On the other hand, a comparative empirical analysis with fundamental characteristics is also necessary in order to answer the research question motivating the study. 
Theoretical underpinnings
Theories and intuitions underlying the investigated linkages can be discussed in three principal categories: (i) the nexus between domestic terrorism and governance; (ii) the relationship between transnational terrorism and governance and (iii) debates surrounding the nexus between governance and terrorism. Foundations on the linkage between domestic terrorism and governance are consolidated by the view that citizens in countries have incentives to resort to radical means and political violence against the government (or other institutions), other citizens and political figures (Choi, 2010) . Three scenarios under which they recourse to violence are when: (i) there are grievances on the part of citizens; (ii) there is growing hopelessness and desperation and no peaceful mechanisms by which such grievances can be settled and (iii) citizens think that resorting to terror tactics is legitimate and viable in the communication of their anger and frustration. The logic behind this underpinning is that as long as citizens are endowed with peaceful mechanisms for resolving conflicts, terrorism options may not be practically considered in the resolution of conflicts and settlement of socio-political scores. This narrative is consistent with Taydas et al. (2010) who have argued that "…states characterised with high institutional quality are less likely to experience civil war " (p. 195) . We postulate within this framework that compared to nations with weak governance structures, countries that enjoy comparatively better governance standards are very likely to offer peaceful mechanisms for the settlement of conflicts. This postulation is on the basis that good governance does not offer an appropriate environment for the growth of terror networks because peaceful mechanisms by which to express grievances are available to ordinary citizens.
Transnational terrorism is connected with governance in the perspective that good institutions strengthen the legitimacy of democratic systems in place with shields that protect both citizens and foreigners on the one hand and on the other hand, provide nonviolent channels by which disputes can be resolved (Choi, 2010) . Hence, it is very likely that transnational terrorism is curbed by the following good governance dynamics: (i) political governance, which offers fair and free domestic means for the replacement and election of political leaders; (ii) economic governance, which enables the formulation and implementation of good measures that provide the citizens with public goods and services and (iii) institutional governance, that oversees the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that governance interactions between them. The definitions of governance are consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) .
The theoretical literature has conflicting positions on the nexus between terrorism and governance. Studies focusing on the relationship predominantly build on the scholarship that emphasizes opportunities of violence that are exploited from regime-based differences (democracy versus autocratic) (Hoffman et al., 2013) . While autocracies are characterized with bad governance, democracies endow citizens with liberties to engage economically and politically without substantial interferences from governments. Externalities from good governance are not exclusively positive because some downsides like avenues of mischief may move hand-in-glove with democratic processes. In substance, contrary to stable autocracies, countries that are characterized with strong democracies could very easily be the focus of and target by terrorists entities because violence is curtailed ex-ante and not ex-post by good governance. The articulation on stable democracies is motivated by the perspective that failed or failing states cannot easily control terrorism. More insights into this position is available in Lai (2007) and Piazza (2008a) . The stance has also been confirmed in a broad stream of terrorism literature (Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Piazza, 2007; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018 ).
Conversely, a strand of the theoretical literature is more optimistic on the relationship between good governance and terrorism. For instance, the political access theory (Eyerman, 1998) postulates that countries enjoying strong democracies and comparatively good governance standards are more likely to be immune from terrorism compared to their counterparts with poor democracies and governance. Some of the documented government institutions' facilities that contribute toward this advantage in the negative governanceterrorism nexus include: respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010) ; independence of judiciaries (Findley & Young, 2011) and the six governance dynamics from Kaufmann et al. (2010) . In the light of the above, it is reasonable to infer that good governance provides citizens with avenues of and channels by which grievances from citizens can be settled pacifically without resorting to violence and terrorism (Li, 2005) .
On the empirical front, there is a wealth of literature documenting the positive relationship between democracy and terrorism (see Lee, 2013) . More specific literature on the nexus between transnational terrorism and democracy include: Weinberg (1994, 2001 ); Weinberg and Eubank (1998) and Piazza (2007 Piazza ( , 2008b . Terrorism can be stimulated by domestic competition in environments of good governance (Chenoweth, 2010) . There are two main competing impacts from democratic institutions on terrorism (Li, 2005) . On the one hand, democracy by participation reduces the likelihood for transnational terrorism. On the other hand, due to political deadlock in checks and balances, constraints in government structures and procedures can grease transnational terrorism.
According to Savun and Phillips (2009) , the responsiveness of terrorism to foreign policy is higher than its responsiveness to democratic institutions. In essence, the foreign policy alignment of a country can significantly determine if the country is victim of transnational terrorism organisations, irrespective of prevailing democratic institutions in the country. According to the authors, nations that shy away from international policies are less likely to be targeted by transnational terrorism. This is not the case of countries that are actively engaged in international politics because the foreign policy position adopted by a country can fuel resentment abroad. In summary, irrespective of regime types per se, countries with mature democratic and governance institutions can still be the object of attacks by terrorists' networks if their foreign policy towards countries hosting corresponding terrorist organisations fuels resentment.
Data and Methodology
Data and fundamental characteristics
Data
The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 1996-2012.
The data is from three principal sources, namely: (i) African Development Indicators (ADI) and World Governance Indicators from the World Bank; (ii) the Global Terrorism Database and (iii) an improved computation of terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) . The adopted periodicity is because of data availability constraints.
Three points elicit these constraints. The computed terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) Accordingly, whereas the full periodicity is 1996-2012, two distinctive features are apparent: (i) annual periodicity instead of data averages (or non-overlapping intervals) is employed because the empirical strategy is based on Fixed Effects (FE) estimators which require that the time series properties (T) are large and (ii) the comparative emphasis on governance is based on fundamental characteristics. The resulting T=17 (1996-2012) is therefore based on data availability constraints at the time of the study. This departs from Asongu et al. (2018a) who have used the Generalised Method of Moments and five three-year non-overlapping intervals (1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-2012) in order to avoid misspecification owing to instrument proliferation.
The study uses four different but related terrorism dependent indicators, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The dependent indicator is a record of yearly terrorism incidents experienced by a country. In order to correct for the positive skew in the data and avoid mathematical concerns about log-transforming zeros, the study is in accordance with the literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Biekpe, 2018) in adding one to the base and taking the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents.
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) . Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6 This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another". Unclear terrorism is that, "which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism" (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.
The explaining indicators are nine bundled and unbundled governance variables: corruption-control, the rule of law, government effectiveness, regulation quality, political stability, voice and accountability, institutional governance, economic govenance and political governance. While the first-six unbundled governance variables are from Kaufmann et al. (2010) , the last-three bundled indicators are derived from a statistical technique or Principal Component Analysis (PCA) which is engaged in Section 3.2.1. As observed in the previous sections, these governance variables are consistently being used in an evolving stream of good governance literature (Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015) .
To ascertain that results are not biased by concerns about omitted variables, the study uses five control variables, namely: inclusive development, internet penetration, inflation, economic growth (GDP growth) and military expenditure. First, exclusive development has been established to be positively associated with adherence to and sympathy for terrorists' organisations (see Bass, 2014 ). An eloquent example is the case of Western-born andeducated youth joining ISIL (Foster, 2014) . Furthermore, Tonwe and Eke (2013) maintain that the fundamental cause of Nigeria's Boko Haram is traceable to the fact that the Northern region of the country is less developed compared to the Southern region. We employ the inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI) as a proxy for inclusive development because of constraints in data availability (e.g. the Gini index for inequality). This narrative is consistent with the position that economic hardship on the poor increases their level of grievance and makes them more likely to be sympathetic to or engage in international terrorism (Choi & Luo, 2013) . Second, Argomaniz (2015) and Holbrook (2015) have established that the internet is increasingly being used by terrorists' organisations like ISIL for recruitment, propaganda and coordination of terrorists' attacks.
Third, we expect very high inflation to be associated with violence and political strife because of inter alia: decreasing purchasing power and diminishing domestic investment due to a negative economic outlook (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) . Fourth, economic prosperity is anticipated to reduce the likelihood for terrorists' activities because it is associated with an improvement in the much needed financial resources for fighting the scourge. The intuition for this expectation aligns with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who have maintained that compared with low-income countries, nations with high-income can better absorb the effects of terrorism without significant negative economic externalities. It also important to balance this narrative with recent evidence that: "economic growth is not a cure-all solution for terrorism because it may be associated in some instances with more terrorist incidents" (Choi, 2015, p. 157) . Fifth, as documented by Feridum and Shahbaz (2010), military expenditure is expected to be negatively linked to terrorism.
The definitions of variable are provided in Appendix 1, whereas the summary statistics and correlation matrix are disclosed in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. It can be observed from the summary statistics that the means of variables are comparable.
Corresponding variations from the standard deviations is an indication that we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The objective of the correlation matrix is to control for issues in multicollinearity. An initial assessment shows that concerns about high degrees of substitution are exclusively apparent among governance indicators on the one hand and terrorism variables on the other hand. While the study addresses the concern about multicollinearity in governance indicators by using them in different specifications, the issues in terrorism indicators is not relevant because these are exclusively employed as dependent variables.
Determination of fundamental characteristics
The choice of the fundamental characteristics which have been empirically and theoretically justified in extant comparative African development literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b) 3 are also consistent with recent literature on fighting terrorism in Africa (Asongu et al., 2018b) . They include: legal origins (French civil law vs. English common law), political stability (politically-stable vs. conflict-affected), resource-wealth (resource-poor vs. resource-rich), income levels (middle-income vs. low-income), regional proximity (North Africa vs.
SSA), openness to sea (coastal vs. landlocked) and religious domination (Christianity vs.
Islam).
First, the foundations of legal origin as a distinguishing characteristic in African countries has considerably been documented in the literature over the past decades, notably with respect to comparative advantages in: (i) education, economic growth and openness (Agbor, 2015) ; (ii) adaptation to changing and growing economic conditions (Beck et al., 2003) and (iii) quality of institutions (La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 . The institutional edge enjoyed by English common law countries over French civil law nations which has been theorized by La Porta et al. (1998 , 1999 and Beck et al. (2003) , has been confirmed to withstand empirical scrutiny in recent African development literature (Asongu, 2012a,b; Agbor, 2015) . In a nutshell, the intuition motivating the classification is that the institutional web of formal norms, informal rules and enforcement features within a legal system has some bearing on how terrorism is fought by means of government quality and institutional regimes (Li, 2005; Choi, 2010; Lee, 2013) . Classification of countries in terms of legal origins builds on information from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289) .
Second, in the categorization of countries in relation to conflicts and political strife, there are obviously practical issues with regard to assigning a country to this category in an exclusive and non-arbitrary manner. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the countries by articulating the periodicity and significance of political strife and instability because it is not obvious for a country to be completely conflict-free. With these insights, two groups can be substantiated in terms "civil war" and "political strife". Third, in the categorization of resource-wealthy countries, there are two main issues in the clustering of petroleum-exporting countries. (i) There are some countries which can qualify as wealthy in resources for only a small fraction of the sampled periodicity. This may be either due a decline in the production of resources or the recent discovery of reserves in oil.
(ii) Some countries which are not wealthy in the export of petroleum also reflect macroeconomic features that are similar to those of petroleum-exporting countries. A good example is Botswana which considerably depends on a mineral-intensive industry. We address this issue by exclusively selecting countries for which exports have been petroleumdominated for at least a decade of the sampled periodicity. A minimalist approach is adopted in this study in the perspective that we exclusively select petroleum-exporting nations that meet the underlying criterion, namely: Angola, Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Libya and Sudan.
Fourth, there are two motivations for the categorization of nations in terms wealth. (i)
Wealthy or high income nations have been established to be associated with more resources needed to mitigate the negative externalities of terrorism (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009 ). This is also consistent with a recent stream of literature on the use of foreign aid to mitigate the negative effects associated with terrorism (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017c) . The two narratives are connected in the perspective that foreign aid is disbursed by high-income countries to their low-income counterparts.
(ii) In Africa, income levels have been established to be exogenous to good governance (Asongu, 2012c) , which is essential in the fight against terrorism. The classification of income-levels is consistent with the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank. These include: low-, middle-, 'lower middle'-and 'upper middle'-income countries.
Fifth, regional classification is in terms of SSA and North Africa for a twofold reason.
(i) For the most part, North African countries exclusively reflect Islam-dominated countries from which a significant cause of terrorism such as Islamic fundamentalism may be apparent.
(ii) In accordance with Boyce and Ndikumana (2008) , this distinction (which is consistent with the World Bank's regional classification) provides room for more policy implications.
Sixth, contrary to landlocked nations, coastal countries may provide more avenues for terrorism by means of more networking and movement opportunities. Furthermore, countries that are closed from the sea have been documented to be associated with lower governance quality levels (Arvis et al., 2007) and by extension; political stability/non-violence (which is an aspect of political governance) could provide opportunities for political strife and civil wars that eventually provide a fertile ground for terrorism. Seventh, the classification of This justification for the scale of governance variables has been used in contemporary African governance literature (Asongu et al., 2019) .
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA) technique is adopted to bundle variables for the conceptual relevance of some governance indicators. It is a statistical approach that is employed to reduce the dimensions of a set of highly correlated variables into smaller sets of indicators that are composite and uncorrelated (Tchamyou, 2017 (Tchamyou, , 2018 Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016; Mina, 2017) . High degrees of substitution among governance variables that justify the approach are provided in Appendix 3. The criteria employed to retain common factors or principal components (PCs) are from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have recommended the selection of PCs with an eigenvalue greater than the mean or one.
As apparent in Table 1 , the first PC denoting the composite indicator for political governance (Polgov) has an eigenvalue of 1.647 and a total variation of 82.3%. In the same vein: (i) economic governance (Ecogov) has an eigenvalue 1.863 and a total variation of 93.1% while (ii) institutional governance (Instgov) has an eigenvalue of 1.867 with a total variation of 93.3%. Political governance which is the election and replacement of political leaders consists of voice & accountability and political stability/no violence. Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public goods and is composed of government effectiveness and regulation quality. Institutional governance which is represented by corruption-control and the rule of law, is the respect by citizens and the state of institutions that governance interactions between them. While the definitions are drawn from Kaufmann (2010) , the bundling exercise that is needed to match the definitions with statistical validity is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) . 
Methodology
Given that T>N in most sub-samples, the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator has better 'goodness of fit' properties compared to dynamic estimation techniques such as the Generalised Method of Moments. The FE model is adopted in order to control for characteristics that are consistent with the research question being investigated, notably: country-specific features or the unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that, when a panel consists of observations on fixed and comparatively small sets of countries or cross section units (e.g. specific fundamental characteristics or member states of a given region), there is a presumption in favour of FE (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018) .
Eq. (1) below corresponds to the adopted FE process 4 . 4 The inclusion of a lagged term for terrorism will make the modeling dynamic and the Fixed Effects method will be inappropriate for its estimation because of a potential correlation between the lagged terrorism indicator and the error term. Unfortunately, using a dynamic model like the Generalized Method of Moments would result in instrument proliferation because some fundamental characteristics have countries (N) that are smaller than the number of periods in the study (T). There are various causes of endogeneity. Some are the unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity.
The adopted Fixed Effects regressions control for the unobserved heterogeneteity which is not accounted for by dynamic regressions such as  the error term. The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. They are also carefully tailored to avoid potential issues of multicollinearity associated with governance indicators. In the presence of very high collinearity (as it is the case with the governance indicators), the variables with the high degree of substitution enter into conflict and only a few emerge from the regression output with the expected signs (Beck et al., 2003) . Unexpected signs in the variables of interest obviously lead to misguided policy implications. Hence, the governance variables are employed in distinct specifications. Moreover, the governance variables are comparable because they are employed in different specifications with the same control variables (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016; Tchamyou et al., 2018) . Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively present findings corresponding to the relationships between terrorism dynamics and political governance, economic governance and institutional governance. Each table consists of three-sets of four specifications. Each of the four specifications uniquely corresponds to one terrorism variable. The first-two sets of specifications are related to the constituents of the composite indicator in the third-set.
Empirical results
In Table 5 , the specifications are based on a decomposed full sample in order to articulate the fundamental characteristics for comparative purposes. Panel A, B, C and D respectively show results corresponding to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism.
Governance and terrorism
Regressions from the full sample provide baseline results which are informative and expositional for the comparative analysis. The following baseline findings can be established on the relationship between governance and terrorism in Tables 2-4 Second, from the perspective of economic governance, the following are established:
(i) regulation quality has significant positive effects on domestic terrorism and total terrorism;
(ii) government effectiveness has a significant negative effect on domestic terrorism whereas (iii) there is no significant effect from economic governance on any terrorism variable.
Third, concerning the relationship with institutional governance, the rule of law negatively affects unclear and total terrorisms whereas no significant effects are apparent from corruption-control and institutional governance.
The signs of two control variables are worth discussing. While the sign of internet penetration is consistent with our expectations, that of inclusive human development is unexpectedly positive. The positive effect of inclusive human development may be traceable to the narratives in the literature maintaining that the African elite and middle class are unsympathetic to policies of inclusive development because such policies reduce their vested gains (Poulton, 2014) . Hence, because these elite depend on state resources and have preferences for specific markets, they are very likely to skillfully hamper socio-economic transformations by employing internal (e.g. civil unrest/war) and external (e.g. terrorism)
tactics of violence in order to retain a tight grip on governing institutions (see Poulton, 2014; Resnick, 2015) . This clarification is consistent with Rodrik's (2015) skepticism of the role of the elite and middle class on governance transformations in the continent. Tables 2-4 are included in the estimation of results reported in Table 5 . They are not disclosed because of space constraint. The control variables, information criteria and observations are available upon request.
Comparative economics of governance in terrorism
The following comparative findings are established for domestic terrorism. countries whereas institutional governance is positive in lower middle income countries but negative in conflict-free and upper middle income countries.
Further discussing of results
Some of the findings are expected, others are not while some are conflicting. The conflicting tendency builds on the fact that the edge of governance in fighting terrorism may not be consistent across terrorism and governance dynamics. In what follows, the established findings are discussed in more depth.
First, the projected dominance of higher income countries compared to their lower income counterparts, in the ability to fight terrorism through governance channels, is not consistently apparent. This finding indirectly raises the concern about whether higher income countries in Africa are necessarily associated with higher levels of governance. It is important to note that we do not expect assumptions underpinning the distinction of countries by income levels to be 100% accurate, which is the reason an empirical exercise is needed to either validate or reject them.
Second, the dominance of English common law countries vis-à-vis their French civil law counterparts is confirmed for the most part. Exceptions to this tendency may be traceable to mainstream criticisms of some of the hypotheses underpinning the distinction of nations in terms of legal origins. The following criticisms have been documented on the distinction of countries in terms of legal origins (Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014; Asongu, 2015) . ( were being adopted by former colonies.
Third, the overwhelming dominance of resource-rich countries is consistent with expectations. However, the few exceptions should be seen in the light of the fact that petroleum-wealth could also be directly associated with terrorists attacks if the fruits of petroleum exports are not evenly distributed across the population. This is the case of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Moreover, some countries in the world that have acknowledged scarcity in natural resources have focused more on improving governance standards and preventing civil conflict through consensus-building (America, 2013; Amavilah, 2015) .
Rwanda and Mauritius are some examples in Africa.
Fourth, the assumption underpinning the institutional cost associated with landlockedness and by extension, less effective use of governance mechanisms to fight terrorism, does not withstand empirical scrutiny. This leads to two main inferences. On the one hand, governance standards in landlocked countries may not be significantly lower compared to their coastal counterparts. On the other hand, given that landlocked countries in Africa substantially rely on the seaports of neighboring countries (and road traffic) for the import of heavy equipment and other material needed for the implementation of sound governance standards, the time wasted and associated institutional cost (from land transport)
do not significantly deter their capacities to fight terrorism. Such insignificance may be apparent when air transport is used for emergency cases and sea transport (via neighboring countries) used for preventive measures.
Fifth, the findings based on conflict-affected countries against their non-affected counterparts are the most consistent. This is essentially because the ability of countries not affected by conflicts to use governance mechanisms in the fight against terrorism is significantly higher. In essence, politically-stable countries are likely to provide a more enabling environment for governance and economic development (Asongu, 2018) . This narrative is consistent with Beegle et al. (2016, p.10) , who have argued that; state fragility is significantly linked with less development. By extension, terrorism may also be a product of less effective governance and economic development. This is essentially because civil wars, political strife and state fragility diminish suitable conditions for inter alia: (i) the election and replacement of political leaders (i.e. political governance); (ii) the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (i.e. economic governance) and (iii) the respect of citizens and the State of institutions that govern interactions between them (i.e. institutional governance).
Sixth, the comparative edge of North African countries in relation to their counterparts south of the Sahara is consistent with the findings pertaining to political instability and conflicts in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, the relative inability of SSA countries builds on the fact that violence and political instability have been associated with the sub- 
Concluding implication, caveats and further research directions
We set-out to assess the comparative economics of governance in fighting terrorism in A caveat to this study is that, state-sponsored terrorism is not considered in the conception and definition of terrorism. This is essentially because terrorism is defined as "the actual or threatened use of force by sub-national actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives". This definition therefore does not take on board state-sponsored terrorism. The failure to incorporate this dimension of terrorism complicates the measurement and analysis of the governance-terrorism nexus covered in this study.
Unfortunately, addressing this caveat is beyond the scope of this research because of data availability constraints. Accordingly to the best of our knowledge, data on state-sponsored terrorism is not available.
Future studies would improve the extant literature by investigating what policy variables can interact with inclusive human development to reduce terrorism. Moreover, assessing the how political governance is relevant in mitigating terrorism throughout the conditional distributions of terrorism is also worthwhile for two main reasons. On the one hand, it is overwhelmingly significant across fundamental characteristics. On the other hand, its effectiveness may be contingent on initial levels of terrorism. Quantile regressions can be used to assess the underlying relationships throughout the conditional distributions of terrorism. Furthermore, random effects (also known as mixed effects or multi-level models) could be considered when variables show less variability as apparent in Appendix 4. Insights into how such random effects models can be taken on board are available in Gelman and Hill (2006) and Allison (2009 
